CO129-477 - Public Offices - 1922 — Page 180

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under the beneficent rule of a republic, and even-which seems incredible to any foreigner who has any extensive experience of the interior of China-advocate the abolition of extra-territoriality. As far as I know, these foreigners are all foreigners who have spent their lives in security in China in the midst of foreign communities, such as Peking, Tien-tsin and the coast, and who have no first-hand experience of the interior. One can only regret that these advocates of putting the foreigner under the jurisdiction of so-called Chinese justice cannot be forced to live for six months in some remote village or city in the interior, far away even from the restraining influence of a consulate, and made liable to be publicly and ignominiously dragged to a yamên, forced to kneel on chains to extort a confession, liable to the ignominious and cruel punishment of the bamboo, or, even putting aside the risk of torture, which still goes on in some places, liable to die from cold in the winter in the wretched dens which do duty as prison quarters only last winter I heard of such a case. Such degradation of the foreigner would mean his loss of prestige, and when this comes to pass the interior of China will only become attractive to those wearied of the vanities of this life and aspirants for the martyr's crown-a uoble band whom I admire, but among whom I have no wish to be enrolled as a member.

The state of chaos in China will not be improved until-

1. The strong men get control, and, combining together, gradually put each

province in order.

2. The students are kept in check.

3. The soldiers are reduced to legitimate requirements and kept under a proper

state of discipline, whilst brigands are relentlessly hunted down.

It is impossible to forecast what combinations of strong men will eventually bring back peace and prosperity to the country. I should like to see a combination of such men as Wu Pei-fu in the centre of China, Ch'en Shu-fan in Shensi, Ch'en Chiung-ming at Canton, and possibly Hsiung K'o-wn in Szechuan. Other provinces, of which I have no recent experience, might be able to add to the number. These combined should be able to put an end to the effete puppets of the Peking Government. that visionary impossibility, Sun Yat-sen, and the wind-bag, Wu Ting-fang of the Canton Govern- ment. As regards Chang Tso-lin, who rules supreme in Manchuria, I do not know whether he has improved and is a reformed character from what he was twelve or thirteen years ago when I visited him. He had then recently retired from the leader- ship of the Hunghutzu of the district and had a reputation for cruelty. He disgusted me by bragging about a recent triumph over an enemy, another ox-robber chief, the fact being that he had invited him to a feast of reconciliation, and after the feast had seized the opportunity to have him crushed to death between two of the big stones used for crushing grain.

Chengtu, Szechuan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

G. PEREIRA.

Report by Brigadier-General G. Pereira-of December 14, 1921.

IN 1900 the Chinese people were in a state of unrest, partly caused by a failure of the crops, and partly by the recent introduction of European education and a feeling of the necessity of reform. The movement was primarily anti-dynastic, but the Court, realising its danger, managed to divert the Boxer movement to an anti-foreign outbreak. At that time the country was united under one rule, and enjoyed the benefits of individual security and prosperity under a mild form of autocracy, the only form of government suitable for Asiatic nations in their present undeveloped state. Therefore, whilst the anti-foreigu movement was more dangerous owing to the better organisation under a united Government, still it was greatly lessened and localised thanks to the provinces being swayed by an exceptional number of eminent and capable viceroys and governors, such as Liu K'un-yi at Nanking, Chang Chih-tung at Wu-ch'ang, Li Hung- Chang at Canton, Yuan Shib-k'ai in Shantung and Tuan Fang in Shensi.

In 1900 those who prophesied trouble before the Boxer outbreak were stigmatised as alarmists. whilst those who pooh-poohed the chances of trouble were afterwards abused for their want of foresight. The same will happen again at the present time, the fact being the prophets fail to realise that there are such thousands of unforeseen circumstances that none can foresee, which will divert popular feeling and action into

unexpected courses. This makes it wrong to make definite prophecies, as their fulfill ment is a pure gamble, and it is only the irresponsible man, with a limited loca- knowledge, who ventures to do so. If he turns out to be right he can say, “I told you so," whilst if he is wrong his prophecies are too unimportant to be remembered. At the present time it is universally admitted by all who know China that the country has never been in such a rotten state, and that the experiment of a republic has proved a most dismal failure. The people, especially in the upper classes, are not educated up to the requirements of a liberal form of government, and it will be many years before they attain to it.

Not only do all the evils under the imperial régime still exist, but they are multiplied, owing to there being many heads instead of one. In the old days the millions poured into the Court at Peking, and a good deal of the money was spent in the service of the State, whilst smaller sums, more or less regulated by precedents, and in a measure recognised as legitimate perquisites of underpaid officials, were received by officials. At the present time the millions go into the pockets of the bigger officials, such as Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, Wang Chan-yuau, late Governor of Hupei, and Hsiung Ko-wn, the late ruling spirit in Szechuan, and a little or nothing of this comes back to the State. In the same way the minor officials, with no restraining influence from Peking or fear of public opinion, are out to make what they can, and as quickly as possible, whilst their day of power lasts. In the old days public opinion had much influence over the officials, and if one tried to overstep the limits of squeeze the people rose and there was trouble. Now the soldiers have increased so enormously in numbers and power that they keep the people in a state of subjection and terrorism. The merchants and people long for a state of peace and security in vain.

The break-up of the central power has been the chance for adventurers, and now the provinces are divided against each other, and often a province is split up into factions.

In the old days the army was despised as an inferior profession and a restraining influence kept on it, but the rise of innumerable factions has given the soldiers their chance. Each petty leader is dependent on thein, and the men themselves now thoroughly understand their power. Very few military officers trouble about discipline or take any pains about securing a regular payment for their men. As a result the soldier is generally owed a large amount of back pay, which is sometimes made up for by encouraging looting. If this is not sufficiently profitable the soldiers desert and join a brigand band.

The students are, to my mind, an even greater source of danger, but as I have dealt with them in a recent report, I will not dwell on them now. It must be remembered that, whatever his failings and lack of education, the student of to-day represents the future ruling class of China, and that the ideas he now imbibes will later be developed.

The spirit of unrest is increased by secret societies, which have always existed in China, and have now increased in numbers and power. Though primarily they may be organised against the Chinese Government of the day, still there is often the watchword of "China for the Chinese!" which tends for an anti-foreign feeling. This, at times, may only require a few foolish actions by one or two irresponsible foreigners to fan the spark, and produce a local and totally unforeseen combustion, which once started may easily spread.

In Szechuan, probably the most factious and split-up province in China, with apparently no commanding figure to restore order out of chaos, there is of course a certain amount of safety for the foreigner, whilst the factious are fighting amongst themselves, and the leaders may feel that one day their only chance of escaping may be through the assistance of the foreigners. On the other hand, owing to the lack of any stable form of government or dependence on any central authority, a sudden anti-foreign rising by a mob or engineered by secret societies would be more dangerous than in any other province owing to its inaccessibility.

Through the collapse of Russia, and in a lesser degree of Germany, the power of the foreigner to command respect in China is much less than it used to be, the more so as the remaining Powers are more engrossed in restoring order in their own countries. Luckily they can still demonstrate against Peking, Cauton, Wuchang and Nanking, the most important centres of influence in China, whilst with its long coast line other important points can be threatened. Yunnan, too, with the railway to Hanoi and its neighbourhood to Burma, can feel the power of the foreigner, but the western provinces are generally isolated and beyond the reach of a foreign expedition. In the case of Kansu this does not much matter as long as the Mahonimedans and the Chinese

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